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1393 
THE INBETWEENERS: STANDARDIZING 
JUVENILENESS AND RECOGNIZING EMERGING 
ADULTHOOD FOR SENTENCING PURPOSES 
AFTER MILLER 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The status of constitutional and criminal law regarding juvenile 
offenders has been in flux over the last decade and remains so. In recent 
years, children have gradually gained legal rights and protections, but 
many pressing and difficult issues still face juvenile offenders today. 
Throughout the history of juvenile jurisprudence, the protection of the 
child has fluctuated and has been largely state-dependent. Perhaps the 
most concerning situation is when a juvenile may be tried as an adult, or in 
some cases, must be tried as an adult. In such cases, a juvenile defendant is 
left to face the harsh adult criminal justice system. Previously, juveniles 
could even be sentenced to death or life without parole. If a juvenile 
defendant was tried and convicted as an adult, and the homicide statute 
dictated life without parole as the mandatory sentence, he would be sent to 
stay behind bars for the rest of his life—a more extreme sentence when 
imposed on a juvenile than on an adult. 
Fortunately, in June 2012, the United States Supreme Court decided 
Miller v. Alabama,
1
 which represented progress in the Court’s Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence regarding juvenile offenders.
2
 In Miller, the 
Court held mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders to be 
unconstitutional.
3
 Following its reasoning set forth in previous cases,
4
 the 
 
 
 1. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 2. Miller is the most recent in a line of three Eighth Amendment cases in which the Supreme 
Court found that the Eighth Amendment affords juveniles greater protection than adult offenders. The 
first case held that juveniles may not be sentenced to death. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 
(2005). The second case held that juveniles may not be sentenced to life without parole for 
nonhomicide crimes. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).  
 In fact, Miller may not be the last case in this line of jurisprudence; however, that issue is outside 
the scope of this Note. For discussion on whether Miller went far enough (or too far) and whether there 
will be further decisions in this line of cases, see, for example, Mary Berkheiser, Developmental 
Detour: How the Minimalism of Miller v. Alabama Led the Court’s “Kids Are Different” Eighth 
Amendment Jurisprudence Down a Blind Alley, 46 AKRON L. REV. 489 (2013); Craig S. Lerner, 
Sentenced to Confusion: Miller v. Alabama and the Coming Wave of Eighth Amendment Cases, 20 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 25 (2012); Sean Craig, Note, Juvenile Life Without Parole Post-Miller: The 
Long, Treacherous Road Towards a Categorical Rule, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 379 (2013). 
 3. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475 (“Graham, Roper, and our individualized sentencing decisions 
make clear that a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before 
imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.”). The Court thus found that subjecting juveniles 
to mandatory sentencing schemes, rather than deciding on a case-by-case basis, violates the Eighth 
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Court found that “children are different” in a fundamental way: offenders 
under the age of eighteen are incapable of being criminally liable to the 
same extent as their adult counterparts; for example, due to undeveloped 
cognitive abilities, they cannot form the requisite criminal intent in the 
same way as an adult.
5
 
Miller was based on two strands of case precedent.
6
 The first strand of 
cases “has adopted categorical bans on sentencing practices based on 
mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the severity 
of a penalty,”7 and in regards to the juvenile, is derived chiefly from 
Graham v. Florida and Roper v. Simmons.
8
 Thus, this strand implicates 
the Eighth Amendment when punishment is disproportionate to the level 
of culpability of the class.
9
 From the second strand of precedent, which 
includes Woodson v. North Carolina
10
 and Lockett v. Ohio,
11
 the Court 
 
 
Amendment: “By requiring that all children convicted of homicide receive lifetime incarceration 
without possibility of parole, regardless of their age and age-related characteristics and the nature of 
their crimes, the mandatory sentencing schemes before us violate this principle of proportionality, and 
so the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.” Id. 
The Court also reasoned that the discretion involved in deciding whether to transfer a juvenile 
defendant from juvenile court to the adult system is not enough to satisfy the Eighth Amendment; 
instead, there must be an exercise of discretion at sentencing:  
It is easy to imagine a judge deciding that a minor deserves a (much) harsher sentence than 
he would receive in juvenile court, while still not thinking life-without-parole appropriate. 
For that reason, the discretion available to a judge at the transfer stage cannot substitute for 
discretion at post-trial sentencing in adult court—and so cannot satisfy the Eighth 
Amendment.  
Id. 
 4. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 82; Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
 5. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 68) (“[C]hildren are constitutionally 
different from adults for purposes of sentencing. . . . ‘[T]hey are less deserving of the most severe 
punishments.’”). 
 6. Id. at 2463 (“The cases before us implicate two strands of precedent reflecting our concern 
with proportionate punishment.”). 
 7.  Id. 
 8. Id. (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 60–62). 
 9. See id. This Note concerns the context of juveniles as the relevant class of offenders, and will 
therefore focus mainly on Miller, Graham, and Roper, but the cases from which this jurisprudence is 
derived include Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (holding the death penalty for 
nonhomicide crimes violates the Eighth Amendment), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) 
(holding that the death penalty for mentally retarded defendants violates the Eighth Amendment). 
For a discussion of Kennedy in the context of mentally ill defendants’ sentencing and the death 
penalty, see, for example, John D. Bessler, Tinkering Around the Edges: The Supreme Court’s Death 
Penalty Jurisprudence, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1913 (2012); Lyn Entzeroth, The Challenge and 
Dilemma of Charting a Course to Constitutionally Protect the Severely Mentally Ill Capital Defendant 
from the Death Penalty, 44 AKRON L. REV. 529 (2011). 
For a discussion of Atkins and the role of the jury in capital sentencing, see, for example, Bryan A. 
Stevenson, The Ultimate Authority on the Ultimate Punishment: The Requisite Role of the Jury in 
Capital Sentencing, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1091 (2003). 
 10. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
 11. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
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“prohibited mandatory imposition of capital punishment, requiring that 
sentencing authorities consider the characteristics of a defendant and the 
details of his offense before sentencing him to death.”12 The rationale in 
these two lines of cases merges in Miller and leads to “the conclusion that 
mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth 
Amendment.”13 
This was an enormous win for the juvenile justice system, because it 
meant that the Court had recognized that even homicide does not warrant a 
mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole if the offender is 
less than eighteen years old at the time of the crime.
14
 The Court thus 
recognized that “children are constitutionally different,” in all cases, and 
fundamentally so.
15
 It concluded that, as a constitutional rule, juveniles’ 
cognitive development has not progressed enough to warrant adult 
sentencing (save for extreme circumstances, which the Court did not 
outline).
16
 That conclusion has major implications for juvenile sentencing 
and, more generally, juvenile justice.
17
 
The changing landscape for juveniles has not fully settled following 
Miller. There is still a question of whether juveniles can be sentenced to 
life without parole at all, and, if so, when and under what circumstances.
18
 
Moreover, it is not completely clear whether Miller applies retroactively, 
to defendants who were juveniles at the time of their crimes and who were 
convicted and sentenced to mandatory life without parole prior to the 
ruling.
19
 
 
 
 12. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463–64. This second strand of precedent is indeed crucial to the 
holding in Miller, because the ultimate holding indicates that a judge must consider the youthful 
characteristics of a juvenile before sentencing him to life without parole. While this strand of 
precedent is important, it will only be relevant to the second portion of this Note. See discussion infra 
Part II. 
 13. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. 
 14. Consequently, crimes that are less severe should certainly warrant consideration of a 
juvenile’s youthful characteristics in deciding whether to transfer the juvenile to adult court or 
sentence the juvenile to adult punishments. Thus, it is more prudent and more concurrent with the 
Eighth Amendment to create a national age cutoff of juvenileness. See discussion infra Part I. 
 15. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. 
 16. Id. 
 17. This includes the possibility, and arguably the recognition after these cases, of a 
constitutional category of juvenile set at age eighteen. See discussion infra Part I. 
 18. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (“[G]iven all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision 
about children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate 
occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.”); see also 
Berkheiser, supra note 2; Lerner, supra note 2.  
 19. States are currently deciding individually whether the ruling will apply retroactively. They 
have come down on opposite sides of the issue without a clear pattern. Moreover, if Miller is indeed 
retroactive, it is unclear how such retroactivity will apply to defendants. On the one hand, a hearing by 
a judge considering the defendant’s youthful characteristics at the time of the crime (often many years 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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After Miller, there are two related, unsettled issues that contribute to 
the daunting uncertainty facing juvenile offenders. First, there is no 
uniform definition or cutoff of the “juvenile” class of defendants in the 
United States, which means due process may differ from state to state, 
depriving some children of the full constitutional protection intended by 
the Court. The Court’s decision in Miller may necessitate a constitutional 
definition of “juvenile” as a person under eighteen years old. 
Second, if the neurological research and social science on which Miller 
was based conclude that cognitive abilities are not fully developed until 
around age twenty-five, it may be arbitrary and inconsistent to choose age 
eighteen as the age after which a defendant may be subject to mandatory 
life without parole, or even the death penalty.
20
 That is, if traditional norms 
of adulthood have been disproven by cognitive science, and the brain 
continues to develop past the age of eighteen, the Court should have 
placed the cutoff beyond age eighteen. The distinction of adulthood 
beginning at age eighteen is arguably based on no more than traditional 
and outdated norms. Should judges be given discretion to consider 
whether a young-adult defendant has not developed to his full cognitive 
capacity, such that he should not be charged as an adult and sentenced to 
death, as in Roper,
21
 life without parole for nonhomicide crimes, as in 
Graham,
22
 or mandatory life without parole, as in Miller?
23
 The Court’s 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and cognitive science articulated in 
Miller and its forebears may necessitate legal recognition of a stage of life 
between adolescence and adulthood often called “emerging adulthood,”24 
during which defendants should be entitled to further special consideration 
under the Eighth Amendment.
25
 
 
 
earlier) would be extremely difficult and subjective. On the other hand, a judge considering the 
defendant as he is at the time of the hearing would be akin to a quasi-parole hearing, and would be 
similarly difficult. 
 The issue of retroactivity lies beyond the scope of this Note. For more on this issue, see, for 
example, Tamar Birckhead, Should Miller v. Alabama Be Applied Retroactively?, JUVENILE JUSTICE 
BLOG (Aug. 15, 2012), http://juvenilejusticeblog.web.unc.edu/2012/08/15/should-miller-v-alabama-
be-applied-retroactively/, archived at http://perma.cc/FP75-NHSK; Lerner, supra note 2. 
 20. Emily Buss, What the Law Should (and Should Not) Learn from Child Development 
Research, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13, 38–39 (2009) (arguing that the Court’s decision to place the cutoff 
at eighteen in Roper was inconsistent and arbitrary); see also discussion infra Parts I, II. 
 21. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 22. 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 23. 132 S. Ct. at 2464. 
 24. Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late Teens 
Through the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 469 (2000); see also JEFFREY JENSEN ARNETT, 
EMERGING ADULTHOOD: THE WINDING ROAD FROM THE LATE TEENS THROUGH THE TWENTIES 
(2004). 
 25. If the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is really based on the idea that juveniles’ cognitive 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/10
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In Part II, this Note will discuss the background of the trio of juvenile 
Eighth Amendment cases, Roper, Graham, and Miller, and the social 
science, psychology, and neuroscience research underpinning the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in these cases. Then, in Part III, this Note will discuss 
and analyze the issue of establishing a uniform constitutional definition of 
juvenileness that ends at eighteen years of age. Next, in Part IV, this Note 
will discuss the issue of defining “emerging adults” as a separate class 
from juveniles and adults. Overall, this Note will offer two proposals. 
First, that there should be a uniform definition of “juvenile” that ends at 
eighteen years of age, and this should be the cutoff age for juvenile court 
jurisdiction nationwide. Second, that courts should recognize an age group 
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five, called “emerging 
adulthood,” during which judges would potentially consider a defendant’s 
youthful characteristics, capacity for change, and culpability in deciding 
whether to give the defendant a sentence as harsh as his or her fully 
formed adult counterparts. 
II. BACKGROUND & HISTORY 
A. The Miller Line of Cases 
In Roper, Christopher Simmons was convicted of a first-degree murder 
he committed the crime at age seventeen.
26
 After he told friends he would 
commit a murder, he kidnapped a woman, bound her, and threw her into a 
river to drown.
27
 As he turned eighteen before trial, he was convicted and 
sentenced to death.
28
 The Supreme Court overturned the sentence and 
found that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the death 
penalty for offenders who were under eighteen years old at the time of 
their crimes.
29
  
In Graham,
30
 Terrance Jamar Graham pled guilty to and was convicted 
of armed robbery and armed burglary, which he committed when he was 
sixteen and seventeen years old, respectively.
31
 Graham was thereafter 
 
 
function is not fully developed until well past the age of eighteen, then Miller’s reasoning should apply 
to those in the “emerging adulthood” phase that spans from eighteen years old until the person’s brain 
is fully formed—around age twenty-five.  
 26. 543 U.S. 551. 
 27. Id. at 556–57. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 578. 
 30. 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 31. Id. at 52–55. 
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sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
32
 The Supreme 
Court found that in the case of a nonhomicide crime, the Eighth 
Amendment forbids a life sentence without the possibility of parole 
imposed on an offender who was a juvenile at the time of his or her 
crime.
33
 
In June 2012, the Court decided Miller v. Alabama along with the 
companion case Jackson v. Hobbs.
34
 The Court held that a defendant under 
age eighteen could not be sentenced to mandatory life without parole.
35
 In 
this consolidated case, both defendants were fourteen years old at the time 
of their crimes.
36
 The two defendants’ “stories are representative of the 
background, nature of offense, and level of culpability of other children 
sentenced to life behind bars.”37 
In Miller, fourteen-year-old Evan Miller was charged with murdering 
his neighbor.
38
 One night in 2003, he and a friend were in Miller’s home 
when Miller’s neighbor, “Cole Cannon, came to make a drug deal with 
Miller’s mother.”39 Miller and his friend then went to Cannon’s home with 
him to smoke marijuana and play drinking games.
40
 When Cannon passed 
out, Miller took $300 from his wallet and split it with his friend.
41
 When 
Miller went to return the wallet to Cannon’s pocket, Cannon woke up and 
grabbed Miller’s throat.42 Miller’s friend struck Cannon with a baseball 
bat, and Cannon released Miller.
43
 Miller then grabbed the bat and 
repeatedly hit Cannon with it before putting a sheet over his head and 
delivering another blow.
44
 The boys fled, and later returned to the trailer to 
cover their crime by starting two fires.
45
 Later, Cannon died of his injuries 
and smoke inhalation.
46
  
 
 
 32. Id. at 57–68. There was no possibility of parole because Florida had abolished its parole 
system. Id. at 57; see FLA. STAT. § 921.001(1)(e) (2003). Therefore, a mandatory life sentence comes 
with no possibility of parole unless the defendant is granted executive clemency. See Graham, 560 
U.S. at 56–58. 
 33. Id. at 82. 
 34. 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2461 (2012).  
 35. Id. at 2464. 
 36. Id. at 2461–62. 
 37. Ioana Tchoukleva, Note, Children Are Different: Bridging the Gap Between Rhetoric and 
Reality Post Miller v. Alabama, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 92, 95 (2013).  
 38. 132 S. Ct. at 2462–63. 
 39. Id. at 2462. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/10
  
 
 
 
 
2015] EMERGING ADULTHOOD 1399 
 
 
 
 
Alabama law required Miller to be initially charged as a juvenile, “but 
allowed the District Attorney to seek removal” to try him in adult court, 
which the District Attorney did.
47
 Following a hearing, “the juvenile court 
agreed to the transfer.”48 Due to the severity of the crime, as well as 
Miller’s “mental maturity” and prior juvenile offenses, the Alabama Court 
of Criminal Appeals affirmed the transfer.
49
 The State then charged Miller 
with “murder in the course of arson”, invoking the mandatory minimum 
punishment, which was life without parole.
50
 Miller was found guilty, and 
was accordingly sentenced to this minimum.
51
 The sentence was affirmed 
by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, which found that life without 
parole was proportional to the crime and that the fact that the sentence was 
mandatory did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and 
unusual punishment.
52
 The Alabama Supreme Court denied review, and 
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
53
 
In the companion case, fourteen-year-old Kuntrell Jackson and two 
other teenage boys robbed a video store.
54
 On the way there, Jackson 
discovered one of the other boys was carrying a gun.
55
 As the other boys 
walked in the store, Jackson decided to stay outside.
56
 One of the other 
boys pointed the gun at the store clerk and demanded she “give up the 
money;”57 when Jackson entered the store, he saw the boy “continuing to 
demand money” while pointing the gun at the clerk.58 Jackson either said, 
“[w]e ain’t playin’” to the clerk or “I thought you all was playin’” to the 
other boys.
59
 When the clerk still refused, threatening to call the police, the 
other boy shot and killed her. The three boys then fled with nothing.
60
 
Arkansas law gave prosecutors discretion to charge fourteen year olds 
as adults when they have allegedly committed certain serious offenses.
61
 
The prosecutor used this discretion and charged Jackson “with capital 
 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 2462–63. See Ala. Code §§ 13A-5-40(9), 13A-6-2(c) (1982). 
 51. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463.  
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 2461. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. (quoting Jackson v. State, 194 S.W.3d 757, 759 (Ark. 2004)). 
 58. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461. 
 59. Id. What he said was disputed at trial. Id.; Jackson, 194 S.W.3d at 760. 
 60. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461; Jackson, 194 S.W.3d at 758–60. 
 61. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461; see Ark. Code § 9-27-318(c)(2) (1998). 
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felony murder and aggravated robbery.”62 Jackson moved to transfer his 
case to juvenile court, but the trial court denied that motion after 
considering the circumstances of the crime, a psychiatric examination, and 
Jackson’s juvenile criminal history and prior arrests.63 The state appellate 
court affirmed the denial.
64
 Subsequently, a jury convicted Jackson of the 
crimes.
65
 The judge sentenced him to life without parole—the “‘only . . . 
possible punishment.’”66 Jackson did not appeal the sentence, and the 
Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed his convictions.
67
 
After Roper v. Simmons,
68
 in which the Supreme Court “invalidated the 
death penalty for all juvenile offenders under” age eighteen,69 Jackson 
filed a habeas corpus petition.
70
 He argued that mandatory life without 
parole for a fourteen year old violated the Eighth Amendment, using 
Roper as a basis for support.
71
 The circuit court rejected the argument and 
granted the government’s motion to dismiss.72 While that ruling was 
undergoing appeal, the Supreme Court decided Graham v. Florida,
73
 
holding that life without parole sentences for juvenile nonhomicide 
offenders violate the Eighth Amendment.
74
 The parties filed briefs on the 
issue, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of 
Jackson’s petition.75 The court found that “Roper and Graham were 
‘narrowly tailored’” and therefore did not apply in Jackson’s case.76 The 
two dissenting justices “noted that Jackson was not the shooter and that” 
there was little evidence he intended to kill anyone.
77
 The dissenters also 
argued that the mandatory sentence ran contrary to the holding in Graham 
that “‘age is relevant to the Eighth Amendment, and criminal procedure 
laws that fail to take defendants’ youthfulness into account at all would be 
 
 
 62. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. (quoting Appeal at 55, Jackson v. Hobbs, 2012 WL 94588 (U.S. 2012) (No. 10-9647). 
 67. Id.; see Jackson, 194 S.W.3d at 757. 
 68. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 69. Id. at 578. 
 70. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 74. Id. at 82. 
 75. See Jackson v. Norris, 378 S.W.3d 103 (2011), rev’d sub nom. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 
2455 (2012). 
 76. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461 (quoting Jackson, 378 S.W.3d at 106, rev’d sub nom. Miller v. 
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)). 
 77. Id. at 2461–62; see Jackson, 378 S.W.3d at 107–09 (Danielson, J., dissenting). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/10
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flawed.’”78 Along with Miller’s case, the United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari, electing to decide the cases together.
79
 The Court 
reversed each case, holding that mandatory life without parole is improper 
for defendants under age eighteen and that judges must consider the 
defendant’s circumstances and capacity for culpability.80 
More specifically, the Court held that mandatory life sentences without 
parole for juvenile offenders constitute cruel and unusual punishment, and 
therefore violate the Eighth Amendment.
81
 The Court based this holding 
on two strands of precedent.
82
 The first strand was based on Roper and 
Graham, which barred capital punishment for juveniles and life without 
parole for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes, respectively.
83
 In 
these cases, the Court found the sentencing procedures in question applied 
disproportionately severe punishments to a class of offenders that could 
not be considered as culpable as their adult counterparts. In other words, 
the severity of the adult punishments outweighed the culpability of 
juvenile offenders in all cases.
84
 The second strand was based on Woodson 
v. North Carolina
85
 and Lockett v. Ohio,
86
 in which the Court found that a 
sentencing authority must take the characteristics of a defendant and the 
details of the offense into account before imposing a death sentence.
87
 
Considering both of these strands of precedent, the Court in Miller 
concluded that juveniles deserve individualized consideration before being 
sentenced to life without parole.
88
 In doing so, the Court made clear that 
for the purposes of the holding—as in Roper89 and Graham90—the cutoff 
to qualify as a juvenile rests at eighteen years of age.
91
  
 
 
 78. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462 (quoting Jackson, 378 S.W.3d at 109 (Danielson, J., dissenting)). 
 79. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463. 
 80. Id. at 2464. 
 81. Id. at 2475. 
 82. Id. at 2463. 
 83. Id.; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 
(2005). 
 84. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463–64 (citations omitted). 
 85. 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
 86. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
 87. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463–64. 
 88. Id. at 2464. 
 89. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
 90. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010). 
 91. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475. 
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B. Social Science and Neurological Background 
The first strand of precedent in these three cases—i.e., the Court’s view 
that juveniles as a class are less culpable than their adult counterparts—
comes from the fundamental difference in development between children 
and adults.
92
 To support its finding that “children are different,”93 the 
Court relied on neurological and social science research, which together 
has firmly concluded that children under the age of eighteen are less 
cognitively developed than adults, and therefore less capable of criminal 
culpability and less deserving of the severest of punishments.
94
  
The Court in Miller indicated that the science and social science had 
become stronger since Graham and Roper, thus further supporting the 
conclusions in those cases.
95
 The trend of changes in social science, 
psychology, cognitive science, and neuroscience, which now points to 
differences between juvenileness, adulthood, and a stage in between the 
two, supports the holdings of these three important cases and indicates the 
potential for further change.
96
 
C. Emerging Adulthood 
The research on which the decisions were based largely shares the 
conclusion that cognitive development continues into a person’s mid-
twenties, on average.
97
 Though the Court decided to place a bright-line 
rule at eighteen years of age, which runs somewhat contrary to its 
 
 
 92. Id. at 2464–65 (finding that youth are not as blameworthy as adults; exhibit “transient 
rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences;” have a lessened ‘“moral 
culpability,’” and have a greater chance for rehabilitation and reformation over the years as 
neurological development occurs); see also Berkheiser, supra note 2. 
 93. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 2470; see also ARNETT, supra note 24; Arnett, supra note 24. 
 94. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 passim; see also Arnett, supra note 24. 
 95. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 n.5 (“The evidence presented to us in these cases indicates that the 
science and social science supporting Roper’s and Graham’s conclusions have become even 
stronger.”). 
 96. See, e.g., ARNETT, supra note 24; Arnett, supra note 24. 
 97. See, e.g., ARNETT, supra note 24; Arnett, supra note 24. See also Melissa S. Caulum, 
Comment, Postadolescent Brain Development: A Disconnect Between Neuroscience, Emerging 
Adults, and the Corrections System, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 729, 731; Grace E. Shear, Note, The 
Disregarding of the Rehabilitative Spirit of Juvenile Codes: Addressing Resentencing Hearings in 
Blended Sentencing Schemes, 99 KY. L.J. 211, 225 (2010) (footnote omitted) (“Studies indicate that 
‘[t]he human brain continues to mature until at least the age of twenty-five, particularly in the areas of 
judgment, reasoning, and impulse control.’ . . . Recent studies conclude ‘that emerging adulthood is a 
period between adolescence and adulthood which is theoretically and empirically distinct.’”) (citing 
Caulum, supra, at 731, 739). 
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reasoning in the opinions upon closer examination,
98
 the decisions and 
reasoning present several encouraging developments. 
That the Court defined the age of majority at eighteen is promising. 
The Court provided an explicit cutoff for the purposes of the Eighth 
Amendment, which means that there may be an argument to define the 
juvenile–majority distinction at eighteen across the board. Moreover, the 
reasoning behind the decision is promising because it may leave open the 
possibility for a separate category of rules for defendants between the 
stages of juvenile and adult. The remainder of this Note will cover these 
two possibilities in more depth. 
D. Changes in Juvenile Justice 
The juvenile justice system has changed considerably over time.
99
 
Relatively recently, the system consisted of various sorts of judicial 
waiver, automatic transfer, and prosecutorial transfer of juveniles under 
eighteen.
100
 Essentially, the system has allowed for juveniles under the age 
of eighteen to be transferred to adult court and be tried as adults under 
various conditions and varying procedures depending on the state.
101
 The 
age of eighteen has been the cutoff for the age of majority in several other 
circumstances, like Miranda rights
102
 and homeless assistance.
103
 Then, the 
Court in Miller held the cutoff at eighteen years of age,
104
 based on 
findings in psychological and neurological research.
105
 
 
 
 98. Buss, supra note 20, at 37–41; see discussion infra Part II. 
 99. See, e.g., Hillary J. Massey, Note, Disposing of Children: The Eighth Amendment and 
Juvenile Life Without Parole After Roper, 47 B.C. L. REV. 1083 (2006); see also Tchoukleva, supra 
note 37, at 98–100 (detailing history of juvenile justice system). 
 100. See, e.g., Rachel Jacobs, Note, Waiving Goodbye to Due Process: The Juvenile Waiver 
System, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 989 (2013); Massey, supra note 99; Tchoukleva, supra note 37; 
see also Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2474 (2012). 
 101. See Jacobs, supra note 100; see also, e.g., ILL. JUVENILE JUSTICE COMM’N, RAISING THE 
AGE OF JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION: THE FUTURE OF 17-YEAR-OLDS IN ILLINOIS’ JUSTICE 
SYSTEM (2013).  
 102. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (recognizing differences between adults 
and juveniles as relevant to Miranda custody analysis). 
 103. See, e.g., McKinney–Vento Homeless Assistance Act of 1987, 42 U.S.C. § 11301 et seq. 
(2012); see also Raise the Age, JUVENILE JUSTICE INITIATIVE (last updated May 14, 2013), 
http://jjustice.org/juvenile-justice-issues/raise-the-age/, archived at http://perma.cc/2TBL-TUTN. 
 104. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012). 
 105. See id. at 2464–66; see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551 (2005); Mariko K. Shitama, Note, Bringing Our Children Back from the Land of Nod: Why 
the Eighth Amendment Forbids Condemning Juveniles to Die in Prison for Accessorial Felony 
Murder, 65 FLA. L. REV. 813 (2013); Massey, supra note 99; Tchoukleva, supra note 37; Jacobs, 
supra note 100. 
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III. THE COURT DEFINED THE JUVENILE-MAJORITY DISTINCTION AT 
EIGHTEEN 
A. “Children are Different”—But Are Not Treated Differently in Practice 
Children are constitutionally different, according to current Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence, but this is not reflected in their treatment by 
the criminal justice system.
106
 For as far as the Miller line of cases took 
juveniles, the amount of ground covered is still painfully inadequate. 
For the purposes of the Eighth Amendment, defendants under age 
eighteen at the time of their crimes are fundamentally different from adults 
according to the Court’s reasoning in Miller and its predecessors.107 So at 
least for serious offenses with severe punishments, like the crimes in 
Roper,
108
 Graham,
109
 and Miller,
110
 the line between majority and juvenile 
is eighteen, as set forth by the Supreme Court. 
However, for the most part, states are free to implement a juvenile 
justice system—including courts, correctional facilities, and rehabilitation 
programs—as they see fit. Beyond the Eighth Amendment challenges 
decided by the Court—since the Eighth Amendment has been incorporated 
by the Fourteenth Amendment to apply against the states—the states have 
exclusive authority to decide the reach of their juvenile courts. This 
presents a problem—some states have cutoffs before age eighteen that 
force defendants to be tried as adults for certain crimes.
111
 Thus, in some 
states, defendants that the Supreme Court considers juveniles can be 
treated, charged, and sentenced as if they were adults for certain types of 
offenses.
112
 
For example, in Missouri, the cutoff for status offenses is eighteen, 
meaning a seventeen year old may be considered a juvenile for offenses 
based upon status, like violation of curfew. However, in Missouri, the 
cutoff for delinquency offenses is seventeen, meaning a seventeen year old 
will automatically be tried as an adult for an offense like stealing, assault, 
or homicide. Therefore, in first-degree homicide cases in Missouri, after 
Miller, there is the possibility that a seventeen year old defendant will be 
 
 
 106. Aaron Sussman, The Paradox of Graham v. Florida and the Juvenile Justice System, 37 VT. 
L. REV. 381 (2012); Tchoukleva, supra note 37, at 102. 
 107. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475; Graham, 560 U.S. at 82; Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
 108. 543 U.S. 551 (homicide crime resulting in a death penalty sentence). 
 109. 560 U.S. 48 (nonhomicide crime resulting in a life without parole sentence). 
 110. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (homicide crime resulting in a mandatory life without parole sentence). 
 111. See, e.g., ILL. JUVENILE JUSTICE COMM’N, supra note 101. 
 112. Id. 
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tried as an adult but may not be sentenced under the state’s homicide 
statute because it mandates either a sentence to death or life without 
parole. For that one year, the statute is unconstitutional as applied to that 
defendant. 
The difference in cutoffs for juvenileness across the states presents 
problems. Cutoffs below eighteen are a problem because they conflict with 
the reasoning that “children are different,” as the Supreme Court has now 
espoused on multiple occasions.
113
 If children under eighteen really are 
different, and cannot as a matter of law,
114
 or as a matter of course,
115
 be 
held as culpable as adults because they are not capable of forming the 
same criminal intent as their adult counterparts,
116
 this should apply to any 
crime, not only serious crimes with extreme punishments. 
If a child under eighteen is incapable of forming the requisite intent of 
an adult counterpart to be sentenced to life without parole in a 
nonhomicide case,
117
 for example, then it stands to reason that the child 
cannot form the criminal intent of an adult mind to commit a less serious 
crime and be culpable for the full adult punishment. The reasoning is no 
different for a lesser crime—the constitutional issues associated with 
sentencing children to the harshest of penalties should exist for any crime 
committed by a juvenile, even if mild in manner, and the Court’s 
hesitation to jail a child for life should extend to any adult punishment 
imposed on a child. 
In reality, sentences for defendants under eighteen years of age are per 
se more severe than identical or comparable sentences for adults.
118
 Being 
incarcerated for any amount of time is harsher (likely traumatic) for kids, 
 
 
 113. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469, 2470; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 passim 
(2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 passim (2005); Tchoukleva, supra note 37. 
 114. Graham 560 U.S. at 82; Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
 115. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (“‘But given all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision 
about children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate 
occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon. That is 
especially so because of the great difficulty we noted in Roper and Graham of distinguishing at this 
early age between ‘the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, 
and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’ Although we do not 
foreclose a sentencer’s ability to make that judgment in homicide cases, we require it to take into 
account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing 
them to a lifetime in prison.” (emphasis added) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573)). 
 116. Id. at 2475; Graham, 560 U.S. at 82; Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
 117. Graham, 560 U.S. at 82. 
 118. See Tchoukleva, supra note 37, at 104. See also Andrea Wood, Comment, Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment: Confining Juveniles with Adults After Graham and Miller, 61 EMORY L.J. 1445 
(2012); Jacobs, supra note 100, at 1002–05.  
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and can sometimes be a great detriment to a child’s life if it is extended.119 
Though juvenile detention often includes educational services, holding a 
child out of school and away from his or her normal environment can be 
damaging to development, especially when the child is away from his 
family.
120
 Consequently, the systems that see the best results are those that 
focus on rehabilitation and smooth reentry, rather than long, deterrence-
focused sentences.
121
 Older teens have needs that cannot be overstated.
122
 
A seventeen year old offender needs appopriate developmental and school 
environments in order to develop properly into an emerging adult and 
eventually a fully formed adult.
123
 
Thus, because any sentence is harsh for a child under eighteen years of 
age, the Court’s analysis in Miller should extend beyond just those 
sentences that would be considered harsh for adult offenders. The harshest 
sentences in their respective order are death, life without parole, and life in 
prison with the possibility of parole. But other sentences should not be 
foreclosed simply because they are less harsh; that they are harsh when 
considered on their own should place them under the Court’s protection of 
juvenile defendants laid out in Miller and its predecessors. 
In the last year, the state of Illinois made a change to its long-standing 
law defining the jurisdictional reach of its juvenile courts, changing its 
definition of majority to eighteen years and above.
124
 In fact, in doing so, 
Illinois joined thirty-eight other states that set the minimum age for 
prosecution in adult court at eighteen.
125
 Before the change, the juvenile 
cutoff was below eighteen in thirteen states.
126
 The remaining states stand 
opposed to the Court’s understanding of the majority-age cutoff. Thus, 
unless these states raise their cutoffs to at least age eighteen, these states 
stand opposed to the Eighth Amendment.  
 
 
 119. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 100, at 1002–05; Tchoukleva, supra note 37, at 104; Wood, 
supra note 118. 
 120. Jacobs, supra note 100, at 1002–05. 
 121. See MARY ANN SCALI ET AL., NATIONAL JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR. & CENTRAL JUVENILE 
DEFENDER CTR., MISSOURI: JUSTICE RATIONED, AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND 
QUALITY OF JUVENILE DEFENSE REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS (2013). 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. 
 124. Raise the Age, supra note 103. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See id. That the age is below eighteen in a minority of states does not make the issue 
insignificant. Juvenile defendants and other youth in the states with lower ages face very real risks that 
should be addressed by a national adoption of eighteen as the cutoff age for juvenile jurisdiction. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/10
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IV. THE JUVENILE-MAJORITY DISTINCTION SHOULD BE EIGHTEEN 
NATIONWIDE 
Because the Court explicitly held that eighteen should be the cutoff 
between childhood and adulthood, practically assumed this to be true 
without pause,
127
 and then bolstered that definition with social science and 
neurological research,
128
 it stands to reason that eighteen is the cutoff for 
the definition of juvenile under the Constitution. This is true for the harsh 
penalties in the trio of Eighth Amendment cases, but it should be extended 
to other cases. 
Thus, the juvenile–majority cutoff should be eighteen in every state. 
First, the Court may already have dictated this in its trio of decisions.
129
 In 
Miller, Graham, and Roper, when the Court held that juveniles deserve 
additional protection under the Eighth Amendment, it used eighteen as the 
age of juvenileness.
130
 In doing so, the Court implicitly and explicitly held 
that juvenileness, as a constitutional matter, ends on a person’s eighteenth 
birthday. 
Moreover, because the defendants in Graham and Miller were not even 
seventeen at the time of their crimes,
131
 the Court’s holdings in these two 
cases further support the argument that the Court held eighteen to be the 
cutoff for the definition of juvenileness. That is, the Court could have held 
that fourteen was too young to be sentenced as an adult in Miller,
132
 or that 
sixteen was too young in Graham,
133
 but instead held in both that a cutoff 
below eighteen was too low.
134
 Whether the Court did so consciously or 
not,
135
 these holdings must represent the Court’s belief that eighteen is 
when childhood ends.
136
 Compellingly, the Court in Roper spoke in 
 
 
 127. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 128. Id. 
 129. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551 (2005). 
 130. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460; Graham, 560 U.S. at 82; Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
 131. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461–62; Graham, 560 U.S. at 53–54. The defendant in Roper was 
seventeen at the time of his crime, however. Roper, 543 U.S. at 556. 
 132. Both defendants in Miller were fourteen years old at the time of their crimes. Miller, 132 S. 
Ct. at 2461–62. 
 133. The defendant in Graham was sixteen at the time of his crime. Graham, 560 U.S. at 53–54. 
 134. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460; Graham, 560 U.S. at 82. 
 135. Generally, we assume the Court makes decisions intentionally. Here, even if the Court 
decided arbitrarily, its holding represents a belief, conscious or unconscious, that eighteen is the end of 
juvenileness. If the decision was arbitrary, it is because the Court arguably should have gone further 
(and chosen a higher cutoff), according to the psychology forming the basis of the three decisions. 
Buss, supra note 20, at 36 (discussing the research in relation to Roper); see discussion infra Part II. 
 136. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460; Graham, 560 U.S. at 82. 
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explicit terms about placing the cutoff at age eighteen, acknowledging that 
“[eighteen] is the point where society draws the line for many purposes 
between childhood and adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at which the 
line . . . ought to rest.”137 
Also, the Court in Miller, Graham, and Roper spoke of the various 
defendants in terms of youth and juvenileness,
138
 despite the fact that the 
defendants were classified as adults and tried as such in their respective 
states.
139
 In doing so, the Court explicitly classified the defendants as 
juveniles because they were under eighteen.
140
 This is especially obvious 
in Roper because the defendant was seventeen at the time of his crime,
141
 
and the Court still referred to him as a “juvenile” throughout.142 Moreover, 
while the psychological research indicates that cognitive development 
lasts until past age eighteen,
143
 the Court decided consciously to choose a 
cutoff of eighteen.
144
 
If the Court has not spoken explicitly enough, then implementation of a 
uniform definition of juvenile at eighteen would take an explicit Supreme 
Court case,
145
 a mandate by Congress,
146
 or a sea change of state laws in 
the remaining states with cutoffs below eighteen.
147
 In either case, the 
Court—having spoken in Miller, Graham, and Roper—should prompt one 
 
 
 137. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005). 
 138. Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 passim; Graham, 560 U.S. 48 passim; Roper, 543 U.S. 551 passim. 
 139. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461–62; Graham, 560 U.S. at 53; Roper, 543 U.S. 557. 
 140. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461–63; Graham, 560 U.S. at 82; Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
 141. Roper, 543 U.S. at 556. 
 142. Roper, 543 U.S. 551 passim.  
 143. See, e.g., Arnett, supra note 24; ARNETT, supra note 24; see also discussion infra Part II. 
 144. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460; Graham, 560 U.S. at 82; Roper, 543 U.S. at 574 (“Drawing the 
line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the objections always raised against categorical rules . . . 
however, a line must be drawn. . . . [Eighteen] is the point where society draws the line . . . . It is, we 
conclude, the age at which the line . . . ought to rest.”). 
 145. See, e.g., Berkheiser, supra note 2, at 514–17; Craig, supra note 2, at 409–10; Lerner, supra 
note 2 at 39. 
 146. An explicit piece of legislation might be unconstitutional if it would infringe upon the states’ 
police powers or rights to create juvenile court systems independently. 
 147. Even if the law itself would be outside the purview of Congress, the legislature could attempt 
to use a different means of coercion to get the states to pass identical laws. A classic example of this 
was the National Minimum Drinking Age Act, which coerced the states to pass laws to make the legal 
drinking age twenty-one by threatening to withhold ten percent of their federal highway funding—a 
significant portion—if they did not comply. National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984, 23 U.S.C. 
§ 158 (2012). The Supreme Court found the Act to be a valid and constitutional use of Congress’s 
spending powers. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 Otherwise, there are groups such as the National Juvenile Defender Center or the Department of 
Justice that could participate in encouraging the spread of reform in the states’ juvenile justice 
systems. 
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of these to occur; the societal and constitutional cutoffs of juvenileness at 
the very least implicitly, if not explicitly, rest at eighteen.
148
 
Though Miller, Graham, and Roper concerned serious crimes and 
sentences,
149
 the Court did not qualify its language in holding eighteen as 
the cutoff for the definition of juvenileness under the Eighth 
Amendment.
150
 Therefore, a broader definition of juvenileness is 
preferrable to the narrow holdings in these cases. Sentences imposed on 
juveniles carry heavy weight, even if they are not as extreme as in these 
three cases. 
Placing the juvenile-majority distinction at eighteen should have 
positive effects, such as eliminating automatic waiver for certain 
defendants under eighteen,
151
 which will solve many of the problems still 
facing juvenile defendants today.
152
 Juvenile justice systems in some states 
and areas are horrendous.
153
 The problems in the system amount to direct 
violations of due process for the vast majority of defendants.
154
 The 
problems stem in part from a lack of uniformity and a lack of guidance.
155
 
A nationally consistent definition of juvenileness could begin to provide 
that uniformity and guidance, initating the movement for creating a better 
system. Moreover, a consistent definition of juvenileness would avoid the 
difficult questions faced when a child below age eighteen commits a crime 
proscribed by an adult statute carrying strictly adult punishments, e.g. 
mandatory life without parole, as well as the difficulty in sentencing 
defendants under eighteen who are automatically tried as adults while still 
protected by the Miller line of cases.
156
 A nationally consistent definition 
 
 
 148. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475; Graham, 560 U.S. at 82; Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. The Court’s 
findings will at least have an impact on precedent, but should arguably spur Congress to adopt a 
definition of juvenileness at eighteen, consciously or otherwise, or the states to adopt the societal 
definition in their various juvenile court systems. 
 149. Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (mandatory life without parole for homicide offense); Graham, 560 
U.S. 48, (life without parole for nonhomicide offense); Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (death penalty). 
 150. Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455; Graham, 560 U.S. 48; Roper, 543 U.S. 551. 
 151. See Jacobs, supra note 100 at 1010 n.201. 
 152. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 100; Tchoukleva, supra note 37. 
 153. SCALI ET AL., supra note 121 (discussing the issue mostly in the context of Missouri). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Juvenile defendants and their attorneys still face real challenges, even after Miller, Graham, 
and Roper. In advocating for Eighth Amendment protection, juvenile defendants’ counsel must wade 
through the possible avenues that the court may take, when it is entirely unclear what is proper. For 
example, counsel might be forced to argue against a statute in light of Miller or hope that the judge 
feels the defendant is actually not mature enough to have understood his or her actions. It’s unclear 
exactly how a judge is supposed to decide whether a defendant is fully culpable as an adult or what 
evidence a defendant’s counsel must present. 
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of juvenile could begin to fix many of the problems facing young 
defendants. 
A uniform definition of juvenile would address a multitude of issues 
arising from the disarray in juvenile systems across the country. For one, it 
would facilitate oversight of due process and fairness across states. 
Uniformity in certification for all types of offenses would achieve these 
goals as well. If the cutoff of eighteen applied to status and delinquency 
offenses, the system would exhibit consistency and fairness while 
reducing confusion.
157
 
V. PROPOSING EMERGING ADULTHOOD: A STAGE BETWEEN 
JUVENILENESS AND ADULTHOOD 
A. Going Beyond Eighteen 
Eighteen may be considered too soon for full adulthood. For serious 
crimes with serious punishments,
158
 consideration of the mitigating 
characteristics of youth should not stop at such an arbitrary time as an 
individual’s eighteenth birthday.159 Indeed, if a child under eighteen years 
old is given special consideration due to the child’s youthful 
 
 
 157. See, e.g., ILL. JUVENILE JUSTICE COMM’N, supra note 101. In this seventy-two-page report, 
the Illinois Juvenile Justice Commission studied the issue and decided that Illinois should raise its age 
cutoff of juvenile court jurisdiction to eighteen. Id. 
 158. This Note, mainly because it utilizes the cases to analyze the Court’s Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence regarding juveniles and young adults, focuses primarily on the crimes and sentences 
encountered in Roper (homicide crime and death sentence), Graham (nonhomicide crime and life 
without parole sentence), and Miller (homicide crime and mandatory life without parole sentence). 
However, these are not the only potential crimes or sentences this Note is intended to contemplate; the 
three cases are simply the foundations of this Note and the sources of current Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence, and therefore the best illustrations. 
 Other sorts of issues to which this Note may apply include three strike laws as applied to 
defendants between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five. The extreme harshness of three strike laws 
may place them on a similar level of severity to the sentences mentioned above. 
 One federal example of a three strikes law is 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (2012). For more on three strikes 
laws, and a discussion of their favorability and their overall utility, see, for example, Linda S. Beres & 
Thomas D. Griffith, Do Three Strikes Laws Make Sense? Habitual Offender Statutes and Criminal 
Incapacitation, 87 GEO. L.J. 103 (1998). 
 159. Buss, supra note 20, at 39 (“The Court’s suggestion that a categorical line of eighteen 
accurately divides the mature from the immature, along the relevant dimensions, is particularly 
troubling, because age eighteen may not even be the right place to draw the line for the most typical 
child.”). 
 Professor Buss discusses another complication not reached by the Court in Roper: “Further 
complicating the picture, the pace of maturity appears to diverge predictably and consistently between 
girls and boys . . . .” Id. at 39–40. The issue of gender differences in development is beyond the scope 
of this Note. For more discussion on the impact of Roper on gender differences, which may be 
analogized to current jurisprudence after Miller and Graham, see id. 
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circumstances,
160
 such circumstances that remain after age eighteen should 
warrant special consideration.
161
 Those circumstances that warrant 
leniency, and did warrant leniency in Eighth Amendment analyses, do not 
magically disappear on the individual’s eighteenth birthday. 
B. “Children Are Different,” and Emerging Adults Are, Too 
The psychological research cited by the Court, and the cases 
themselves, indicate that eighteen is not the end of psychological and 
neurological development.
162
 Rather, the research reveals that the brain 
develops well into a person’s twenties.163 Thus, the analysis for children—
that they are “different” from adults, unable to fully form the same level of 
culpability, and prone to bouts of poor decision making—should apply to 
those under twenty-five, as well. Because some brains develop past 
twenty-five, and some finish developing before that time, a bright-line rule 
of leniency prior to that age could present problems. Some potential 
pitfalls that could come from a bright-line rule giving an automatically 
reduced sentence for those under twenty-five include the possibility that 
some defendants with full cognitive capabilities could be sentenced with 
more leniency than is warranted by their circumstances. In order to avoid 
these pitfalls, sentencing emerging-adult offenders would likely need to 
follow a Miller framework, such as consideration of youthful 
characteristics, cognitive development, and capacity for culpability and 
rehabilitation.
164
  
C. Emerging Adulthood as a Life Phase for Sentencing 
Eighteen indeed is an arbitrary cutoff in the context of these cases.
165
 If 
“children are different” because the human brain does not fully develop 
until around age twenty-three to twenty-five,
166
 then basing the cutoff for 
 
 
 160. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 passim (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 passim 
(2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 passim (2005). 
 161. See Arnett, supra note 24. 
 162. See, e.g., Arnett, supra note 24; Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 passim (2012); Graham, 560 U.S. 48 
passim (2010); Roper, 543 U.S. 551 passim (2005). 
 163. See ARNETT, supra note 24; Arnett, supra note 24. 
 164. See discussion infra Part V.F. 
 165. See Buss, supra note 20, at 40–41. 
 166. See Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature than Adults?: Minors’ Access to 
Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop”, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 583 
(2009); Arnett, supra note 24; see also, e.g., Buss, supra note 20, at 39 (“Much of the developmental 
research suggests that the qualities highlighted by the Court, described together as psycho-social 
immaturity, continue to apply to individuals into their twenties, even mid-twenties or beyond.”). 
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the purposes of the Eighth Amendment at eighteen makes little sense.
167
 It 
seems this way of thinking is based on antiquated views, when eighteen 
was traditionally the time when a person became an adult, but this thinking 
is precisely what the findings on which Miller and its predecessors relied 
found erroneous.
168
 
The Eighth Amendment jurisprudence likely stems from the need to 
hedge—keeping the cutoff at the conservative age of eighteen rather than 
twenty-three or twenty-five ensures that fully developed and culpable 
defendants do not receive softer penalties than they deserve.
169
 However, 
the social and cognitive science findings show that the human brain is not 
developed until the mid-twenties; thus, the cutoff is not eighteen.
170
 
Therefore, the Eighth Amendment cutoff seemingly does not follow its 
bases in research.
171
 As Professor Buss explains, there are many other 
reasons that eighteen is the strict definition of juvenileness.
172
 
 
 
 167. See Buss, supra note 20. 
 168. See, e.g., id.; Arnett, supra note 24; Steinberg et al., supra note 166. 
 169. Also, if the “safe,” conservative estimate of eighteen ensures that no guilty party falls 
through the cracks, that rationale is faulty—an innocent or less culpable person falling through the 
cracks is a worse outcome for society than failing to sentence a culpable one strongly enough. 4 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352 ("[T]he law holds that it is better that ten guilty persons 
escape, than that one innocent suffer."). 
 170. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 20; Arnett, supra note 24; Steinberg et al., supra note 166, at 592. 
 171. Buss, supra note 20. 
 172.  
“For the reasons we have discussed, however, a line must be drawn. . . . The age of 18 is the 
point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, 
we conclude, the age at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest.” 
 The Court’s retreat to more conventional, law-controlled analysis when justifying its 
refusal to draw the line between childhood and adulthood any later than eighteen reads, at 
first, like a rejection of all the developmental analysis that came before it in the opinion. Less 
schizophrenically, the Court might be suggesting that age eighteen is the (current) legally 
defined boundary between childhood and adulthood, and that its developmental analysis 
appropriately applies only to legal distinctions within the legally defined category of 
childhood. Put another way, the law might be understood to define the space within which 
developmental analysis is permitted. Similarly, the law might further limit the distinctions the 
developmental analysis legitimately can explore, even within that space (so the correlation 
between life experience and development might be legitimately explored, but not the 
correlation between gender, or race, and development). 
 . . . [T]here is no evidence that Roper is actually taking [a law-centered] approach. The 
thrust of the analysis clearly focuses on the developmental findings, not on legal or cultural 
conventions. More plausibly, the Court invoked this brief generic language about legal 
conventions and the need for bright line rules to avoid confronting the difficult and complex 
implications of its developmentally driven approach. 
Id. at 40–41 (first ellipsis in original) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005)). For 
more on these implications of the Court’s approach in Roper, as well as further discussion of the above 
issues, see Buss, supra note 17. 
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D. Jeffrey Jensen Arnett’s Theory of “Emerging Adulthood” 
In May 2000, Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, a psychology professor and expert 
devoted to the study of juveniles and young adults, published an article in 
American Psychologist
173
 detailing his proposal to recognize a stage of the 
human life span between adolescence and adulthood, called “emerging 
adulthood.”174 Arnett has since written several additional books and 
articles and edited volumes on emerging adulthood;
175
 as such, the topic 
has remained his main area of study.
176
 Emerging adulthood has grown as 
a psychological and cognitive theory since its inception and continues to 
gain recognition.
177
 
The stage of emerging adulthood is the period experienced by young 
adults from age eighteen to twenty-five.
178
 This period of life is very 
different from both adolescence and full adulthood.
179
 Arnett’s proposition 
emerges from the implications of these notable distinctions.
180
 This 
distinction of emerging adulthood seems to follow common sense. So-
called “twenty-somethings” identify with very different sets of 
characteristics than teenagers and “thirty-somethings.”181 “Young 
 
 
 173. American Psychologist is the official peer-reviewed academic journal of the American 
Psychological Association. Publications, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http://www.apa.org/pubs/ 
journals/ amp/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/M2ZQ-YA39. 
 174. Arnett, supra note 24, at 469–80. 
 175. See, e.g., JEFFREY JENSEN ARNETT, ADOLESCENCE AND EMERGING ADULTHOOD: A 
CULTURAL APPROACH (4th ed. 2010); JEFFREY JENSEN ARNETT ET AL., DEBATING EMERGING 
ADULTHOOD: STAGE OR PROCESS (Jeffrey Jensen Arnett ed., 2011); ARNETT, supra note 24; 
ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY AROUND THE WORLD (Jeffrey Jensen Arnett ed., 2012); EMERGING 
ADULTS IN AMERICA: COMING OF AGE IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Jeffrey Jensen Arnett & Jennifer Lynn 
Tanner eds., 2006); INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ADOLESCENCE (Jeffrey Jensen Arnett ed., 
2007). 
 The bulk of Arnett’s work is involved in developing and studying the concept of emerging 
adulthood, which has gained traction since its inception. Currently, the concept is gaining recognition 
and may become a widely accepted phase of life in forthcoming literature. The American 
Psychological Association, for example, seems to endorse it, since Arnett has published in American 
Psychologist on multiple occassions. 
 176. About Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, http://www.jeffreyarnett.com/about.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/HTQ7-AMLR. 
 177. Id.  
 178. Arnett, supra note 24, at 469. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. People from age eighteen to twenty-five experience a period of life where they become 
more independent and begin to figure out their lives and goals. For the most part, they do not have 
children, do not live in their own home, and do not have sufficient income to become fully 
independent. They are still in school and do not have families of their own yet. Id. 
 The vast majority of those under eighteen, on the other hand, embody the traditional view of 
adolescence—they live with their parents and do not have the freedom associated with being over age 
eighteen. Those over age twenty-five (roughly) are the opposite: they embody the traditional view of 
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adulthood” as a term fits more accurately with the latter group,182 though it 
is generally used to describe any of the three or a combination.
183
 
These distinctions are based on more than just common sense, 
however. Indeed, social and psychological research has abounded in the 
time since Arnett coined the term “emerging adulthood.” Those between 
age eighteen and twenty-five are neurologically and cognitively different 
from those both younger and older than these parameters. Based on the 
rationale for leniency for juveniles, the law should borrow Arnett’s 
characterization of this life phase and implement emerging adulthood for 
sentencing purposes. 
E. Implications for the Law 
This distinct life stage has implications beyond the need for more 
precise terminology. During emerging adulthood, the brain is still 
developing.
184
 This stage is part of the period of development on which the 
scientific bases of Miller and its predecessors focused.
185
 Since the Court 
found that “children are different” for the purposes of the Eighth 
Amendment, because their brains have not fully developed to the point of 
adulthood and they are therefore incapable of being as culpable as 
adults,
186
 emerging adults should also be treated differently than fully 
developed adults.
187
 If juveniles exhibit characteristics that are meant to be 
protected by the law, including undeveloped cognitive function,
188
 then 
emerging adults who retain these characteristics should retain the same 
protections.
189
 To shed protections when the emerging adult still needs 
 
 
adulthood—getting married, having families, and settling into established careers. The time between 
these two stages is vastly different from each respective statge. Id. 
 For more discussion and support on this topic, see ARNETT, supra note 24. 
 182. Arnett, supra note 24. 
 183. Id. 
 184. EMERGING ADULTS IN AMERICA, supra note 175. 
 185. See Arnett, supra note 24. 
 186. Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469, 2470 (2012); Graham, 560 U.S. 48 passim (2010); Roper, 543 
U.S. 551 passim (2005). 
 187. See Arnett, supra note 24; Shear, supra note 97, at 225 (“Thus, juveniles reaching the age of 
majority may be more aptly considered ‘emerging adults’ rather than adults . . . .”). 
 188. See Arnett, supra note 24; see also Shear, supra note 97, at 225 (quoting Caulum, supra note 
97, at 731, 739) (“Studies indicate that ‘[t]he human brain continues to mature until at least the age of 
twenty-five, particularly in the areas of judgment, reasoning, and impulse control.’ . . . Recent studies 
conclude ‘that emerging adulthood is a period between adolescence and adulthood which is 
theoretically and empirically distinct.’”). 
 189. See Shear, supra note 97, at 225 (“Juvenile codes promote rehabilitative sanctions, and as 
juvenile offenders retain the very characteristics the codes seek to protect, state courts must adhere to 
the ideological principles of those juvenile codes.”). 
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them, simply because he or she has reached age eighteen, is arbitrary and 
inconsistent with the purpose of the protections themselves. 
F. The Law Should Implement Emerging Adulthood for Sentencing 
Purposes 
The landscape of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and the 
emergence—not only in the fields of psychology and science, but in the 
law
190—of emerging adulthood as a distinct stage of the human life ignite 
a call for a change in sentencing procedures for criminal defendants under 
the age of twenty-five.  
G. Implementation 
When a defendant is under eighteen, the protections of Roper and 
Graham are automatic.
191
 But for emerging adults, the analysis for 
sentencing should follow Miller,
192
 albeit with a higher chance that 
defendants are eligible for full sentencing (because the bar is set so high in 
Miller).
193
 That is, the sentences in question should no longer be 
mandatory for emerging adult defendants, and the court should give 
consideration of their youthful characteristics retained from their 
childhood.
 194
 
Judges should be required to consider a defendant’s characteristics, the 
circumstances of the defendant’s involvement, and the nature of the crime 
itself when the defendant is in the emerging adulthood stage between the 
ages of eighteen and twenty-five.
195
 These protections would be less 
stringent and protective than Miller, yet more protective than adult 
sentencing procedures. Therefore, emerging adult defendants would 
undergo sentencing similar to juvenile sentencing under Miller.
196
 
The implementation of emerging adulthood as a stage of the human life 
cycle in sentencing procedures could be rather simple—potentially simpler 
 
 
 190. 132 S. Ct. at 2475. 
 191. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
 192. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475. Essentially, an emerging adult would be examined in terms of 
the cognitive capacity for rehabilitation and culpability, just like Miller ascribed for juveniles. See id. 
 193. See id. at 2469. 
 194. See Caulum, supra note 97. 
 195. This category includes age twenty-four, twenty-three, twenty-two, or anywhere around those 
ages, since those are the main ages where cognitive development culminates. See Arnett, supra note 
24. 
 196. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475. 
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than that of defining juvenileness at eighteen.
197
 It only takes one Supreme 
Court case in which the Court follows its reasoning and the social science, 
cognitive science, neuroscience, and psychology that laid the foundation 
for those decisions. In doing so, the Court should rule that research and 
precedent dictate that there should be a stage of life between childhood 
and adulthood during which a judge must consider an emerging adult 
offender’s circumstances and youthful characteristics. 
A major issue with this approach, and the likely reason the Court chose 
eighteen as its cutoff,
198
 is that it is difficult to find objective criteria on 
which to base decisions. That is, sentencing judges must be afforded a 
great deal of discretion to implement this system.
199
 This is especially true 
when the range of years and development can vary considerably, as is true 
in the emerging adulthood phase.
200
 This makes it difficult to decide 
objectively whether an emerging adult defendant is capable of culpability 
like that of an adult counterpart. However, the difficulties with 
implementing these criteria are on par with Miller’s framework, and when 
judges are given wider discretion and fewer restrictions than Miller (which 
essentially instructed judges to find a juvenile defendant fully culpable 
only in the rarest occasions), the task becomes easier rather than more 
difficult. 
In the end, the decisions and considerations may end up being 
subjective because there is either an objective line to be drawn at a certain 
age or a subjective consideration of characteristics by a judge. A middle 
ground may be difficult or impossible to find, since the range of different 
people, especially at the emerging adulthood phase, makes it nearly 
impossible to formulate an objective test other than age. Moreover, judges 
are not psychologists and are very much products of their past experiences 
and environments. Therefore, judges should be educated about emerging 
adulthood and how to follow proper sentencing procedures for defendants 
within this group.
201
 
 
 
 197. See discussion supra Part I. 
 198. See Buss, supra note 20, at 37–41; see also discussion supra Part I. 
 199. However, the holding in Miller exhibited no hesitation to toe this line for offenders under the 
age of eighteen. Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455. There is little reason emerging adults should be more 
difficult. 
 200. See Arnett, supra note 24. 
 201. For example, a judge would not automatically know which defendants have developed 
quickly and which have not. This difficult question is much more easily answered by having a set cut-
off age, such as eighteen. See Buss, supra note 20, at 37–41. Moreover, if the cutoff was higher, there 
might be danger of excessive leniency. See discussion supra Part II. 
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To combat these potential issues, the new framework adapted from 
Miller for emerging adults should establish a much lower bar. That is, 
whereas it is very uncommon for juveniles to be sentenced as adults after 
Miller, it might be much more common for emerging adults to fulfill 
adulthood criteria and therefore be sentenced as adults. Transferring the 
Miller framework to emerging adults makes the framework much simpler 
to implement.
202
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In summary, historically, there has not been a uniform, legal definition 
of juvenile. Miller,
203
 Graham,
204
 and Roper
205
 all support the adoption of 
a national, uniform definition: a juvenile is anyone under the age of 
eighteen. If “children are different,” as the Court says,206 then they should 
be treated differently.
207
 Moreover, the definition of “children” should be 
established uniformly. One definition would solve some of the major 
issues facing juvenile defendants in the various juvenile justice systems 
across the country.
208
 Implementing that definition would not be a 
panacea, but it should go a long way toward promoting uniformity, 
fairness in treatment, and due process in these systems, which would 
establish a path to reform. It would also make Miller easier to implement 
because, combined with emerging adulthood as a sentencing phase, the 
Miller framework would apply to emerging adults, would not have as high 
of a bar, and should ultimately fix the consequences and issues stemming 
from Miller as it currently stands.
209
 
Additionally, courts should recognize emerging adulthood as a stage 
between juvenileness and adulthood. If recognized by courts, this would 
help achieve the goals discussed by the Court in its reasoning in Roper, 
Graham, and Miller. Juveniles may be different according to established 
 
 
 202. It is no surprise that Miller on its own would and will be very difficult to implement, and 
especially to implement fairly and consistently. See Lerner, supra note 2, at 30–31. This is partly 
because the framework is based on subjective criteria, whereby judges must somehow decide based on 
very limited evidence whether juvenile offenders have adult capacities to be fully culpable for crimes, 
or on the other hand, juvenile capacities for rehabilitation and change. 
 203. 132 S. Ct. at 2475. 
 204. 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010). 
 205. 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
 206. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 2470; Graham, 560 U.S. 48 passim; Roper, 543 U.S. 551 passim. 
 207. See, e.g., Berkheiser supra note 2; Tchoukleva, supra note 37. 
 208. See SCALI ET AL., supra note 121, for a discussion on the juvenile systems in the United 
States, particularly in the state of Missouri, and the problems that face juvenile offenders within the 
system. 
 209. See Lerner, supra note 2. 
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norms, but, according to scientific research in several fields, emerging 
adults are different as well. It is also logical in terms of common sense: we 
know that the very late teen years and early twenties are different than any 
other time in life, and people undergo almost as much change as they do 
throughout early childhood to adolescence (though not as much 
physically). The brain is still developing until the age of twenty-five. If 
juveniles deserve special consideration because they lack the cognitive 
development to be held as culpable as adults who commit the same crimes, 
then emerging adults should also receive some degree of special 
consideration. Arguably, this consideration may not need to be as drastic, 
since emerging adults are at least further along in their cognitive 
development than juveniles. 
On the other hand, if this emerging adulthood age group is given a 
greater degree of leniency than fully formed adults, it may have the 
potential to allow for some young offenders who deserve punishment to 
avoid responsibility for their actions.
210
 Thus, such a change should not be 
taken lightly and should not be drastic or sudden. Emerging adults should 
be sentenced according to a similar framework as that used in Miller to 
remedy this potential consequence.
211
 
Another consequence of recognizing emerging adulthood might be that 
those in this age group might feel or experience setbacks from being 
placed in what may be seen as a new category of youth rather than that of 
adulthood. In other words, if such a stage of life were more nationally 
recognized, emerging adults might not be considered “adults” for some 
purposes and therefore might not fully enjoy the advantages of adulthood. 
After the legal age to drink alcohol was raised to age twenty-one from age 
eighteen in every state,
212
 the age of twenty-one arguably became the 
benchmark for true adulthood. This is mainly because those between 
eighteen and twenty-one years of age were considered too irresponsible to 
drink alcohol,
213
 and not trustworthy enough to refrain from driving across 
state borders to drink legally.
214
 Emerging adults could experience a 
similar consequence, whereby the true stage of adulthood would be 
 
 
 210. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012). 
 211. Id. 
 212. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 213. Id. at 208–09 (finding that forcing states to raise the drinking age was within Congress’s 
spending powers). 
 214. Id. at 209 (citing PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON DRUNK DRIVING, FINAL REPORT 10–11 (1983)) 
(reasoning that variations in the drinking age between states gave an incentive to drink and drive 
across state borders, because border states had lower drinking ages and would encourage traveling 
across state lines for more favorable (lower) alcohol age limit laws). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/10
  
 
 
 
 
2015] EMERGING ADULTHOOD 1419 
 
 
 
 
considered by society to begin at age twenty-five. Having a legal and 
societal definition of another benchmark, this could essentially create 
another stage of childhood and make life more challenging for young 
adults who are fully formed and wish to be taken seriously. However, this 
problem is not very pressing; the drinking age is a rigid limit, while the 
limit of emerging adulthood is flexible. Also, the difference in the stages is 
not an arbitrary distinction, as it is based on psychological and social 
science research. If the differences really do exist, they are minimal in 
comparison to the benefits achieved by recognizing the phase of 
development.  
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